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Societal stress may cause far reaching political, economic and even geological effects. 
Nevertheless, it is still scarcely investigated, contrary to social stress, which an individual faces in 
their interactions within a society. It is natural to suppose that in its adaptation to a stressor, 
society demonstrates the same objective laws that biological population does, since they are, in 
fact, the closest systems. In the survey, the hypothesis is tested that the collective stress effect 
holds true in society, which must appear – as it happens according to correlation adaptometry 
method in biological systems – in escalation of both correlations between societal characteristics 
and their dispersion. Both tends are observed in Ukrainian society during 2009-2012, as a result 
of political elections – the very priori stressor that affects societal anxiety. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social stress, which an individual faces in their interactions within a society, is now a subject to a 
wide range of research, both physiological and psychological. To the contrary, societal stress, which 
a society feels as a whole, is still scarcely investigated, though it may have far ranging effects. It 
determines a country's foreign policy and military effort (Terrell, 1971); it provokes 
macroeconomic shifts – like it happened in Nigeria, where public anxiety concerning avian 
influenza stroked the rural economy (Fasina et al., 2010); it is considered to be even a geological 
force, able to trigger earthquakes (Molchanov, 2008). 
Thus, it is crucial to assess societal stress, and to forecast its development in advance, which 
requires specific evaluation procedures. These procedures ought to be based on and complied with 
more general principles, e.g. ones of systemic methodology, and stress and coping theories. One 
successful example is the above mentioned research of Louis Terrell, where he confesses that he has 
borrowed key concepts from systems theory. 
 
“(...) to find the social and political conditions within a country which influence the 
levels of effort a nation is willing to expend on its military (...), it [this study] has 
borrowed notions from systems theory – stress and strain – which are represented 
empirically by indicators of societal frustration and social cleavage (stress) and of 
political instability (strain)” (Terrell, 1971: 344). 
 
Nevertheless, in his paper Terrell uses rather physical than biological analogies – making an 
attempt to connect stress and strain quantitatively, like materials scientists commonly practice via 
their stress-strain curves. We find it more beneficial to borrow analogies from biological stress 
theory – in the form developed by Hans Selye and the followers. The reason is that biological and, 
especially, social systems are adaptive – contrary to physical systems that behave merely according 
to the laws of classical mechanics. 
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AIM AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
In the theory of adaptation, the latter is considered as the process of a system's successful transition 
to a new functional state, as affected by factors that exert negative impact upon its normal 
functioning. In this context, “successful” means that in the functional state emerged the system 
renews its normal functioning, while negative factors endure. Alternatively, “unsuccessful” 
transition is one when the system looses its integrality and, therefore, is ruined in the process. 
A system altering its functional state is considered to be a result of two groups of processes 
with contrary directions: adaptation and compensation, which tend to rebuild the system and to save 
its integrity while the rebuilding goes on. In this respect, a transition being successful or not, is 
determined by whether its compensatory mechanisms catch adaptation ones. These complex 
adaptation and compensation mechanisms carrying in a system while it is under rebuilding appear 
in a non-specific tension that Hans Selye would call “general adaptation syndrome”, or later 
“stress” (Selye, 1936). The agents that do cause stress are naturally referred to as “stressors”. 
Assessing the level of a system's adaptation tension is of great practical importance. Data on 
its dynamics point out when a stressor occurred, and how the process develops. In 1987, Alexander 
Gorban et al. offered the correlation adaptometry method to assess the level of adaptation tension 
(Gorban, Manchuk, Petushkova, 1987). It is based on the collective stress effect that the researchers 
discovered before. The effect appears in escalation of: a) correlation between physiological 
parameters in population affected with a stressor; and b) their dispersion. In other words, stressors 
make different physiological parameters of a population's members change more concordantly, 
though within a wider range (in Figure 1, it is visualized in space of two physiological parameters). 
 
 
Figure 1. Collective stress effect (Gorban, Smirnova, Tyukina, 2010: 3194) 
 
Discovered initially on the material of lipid metabolism parameters in the population of 
people working under the stress climatic conditions of Far North, the collective stress effect was 
later proved for other physiological parameters and even for other species' populations. Recently, 
the works appeared that expand the field of usage of the correlation adaptometry method to non-
biological systems. Among the first researchers who, in fact, captured the collective stress effect in 
the field of finance were Françcois Longin and Bruno Solnik; in their case, the believed stressor 
was volatility – variation of market price:  
 
“We studied the correlation of monthly excess returns for seven major countries over 
the period 1960-90. (...) Tests of specific deviations lead to a rejection of the 
hypothesis of a constant conditional correlation. (...) We also find that the correlation 
rises in periods when the conditional volatility of markets is large. There is some 
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preliminary evidence that economic variables such as the dividend yield and interest 
rates contain information about future volatility and correlation that is not contained 
in past returns alone” (Longin, Solnik, 1995: 19). 
 
One of the recent works that intentionally try on the correlation adaptometry method to 
economic systems is (Gorban, Smirnova, Tyukina, 2010); there, financial crises are referred to as the 
adaptation tension in the economy. 
It is worth to note that attempts to bring concepts from general and evolutionary ecology to 
economics are known for a long time. In the 1980s, they resulted in a pleiad of eminent works: 
Kenneth Boulding's Evolutionary economics (Boulding, 1981), Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter's 
An evolutionary theory of economic change (Nelson, Winter, 1982), and Michael Hannan and John 
Freeman's The population ecology of organizations (Hannan, Freeman, 1987), etc. They laid the 
foundations of a new area within economics, where economy is considered as a population of firms 
that emerge, develop and die like living things. 
What is about society, it is, in fact, the nearest to biological population. Therefore, it is 
natural to suppose that the biological analogies are even more likely to work there. As Ralph 
Gerard, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Anatol Rapoport state, 
 
“Since Darwin there has been much discussion pro and con as to whether profitable 
analogies can be drawn between the evolution of species and (...) and of human 
societies. It is suggested that orientations and methods which have been employed to 
investigate biological evolution might also be used in the study of the evolution of 
society. Perhaps these will throw light on the theoretical problem of the similarities 
and differences in the two sorts of evolution” (Gerard, Kluckhohn, Rapoport, 1956: 
6). 
 
But it is also natural to check such assumptions, since “proof by analogy is not proof” – 
regardless of the fact, that “any similarity between two theories implies the existence of a more 
general theory of which the two are special cases” (Gerard, Kluckhohn, Rapoport, 1956: 7). 
According to Martin Sereno, an exhaustive validation must comprise of both theoretical and 
empirical procedures: 
 
“Complex generative and explanatory analogy is characterized by four distinct 
activities: 1) decomposition of the source and target systems, 2) establishment of a 
map between the two systems, 3) generation of predictions about the target, and 4) 
testing of the predictions” (Sereno, 1991: 468). 
 
All the above concerns the collective stress effect, too. An appropriate theoretical validation 
of analogy between biological and social systems was given by Nicolas Rashevsky – a prominent 
Ukrainian-American scientist who founded both mathematical biology and mathematical sociology 
– in a series of works of 1960s on what he called “world set theory”: 
 
“A society is a set of individuals plus the products of their activities, which result in 
their interactions. A multicellular organism is a set of cells plus the products of their 
activities, while a unicellular organism is a set of genes plus the products of their 
activities. (...) A physical system is a set of elementary particles plus the product of 
their activities, such as transitions from one energy level to another. Therefore 
physical, biological and sociological phenomena can be considered from a unified 
set-theoretical point of view” (Rashevsky, 1969: 159). 
 
However, special experimental surveys, aimed to justify whether the collective stress effect 
holds true in society, are also required to complete the validation. Nevertheless, such research has 
4 
 
not been conducted yet. In this respect, the article aims to answer whether using correlation 
adaptometry method is allowable in assessing societal stress. If so, it would help educe the tension 
early on and will be of considerable practical favor to social sciences. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
The input data were taken from the all-Ukrainian pools held by Rating Sociological Group in 2009-
2012 (Rating, 2012). The question to the respondents was the following: “please, name three the 
most actual threats for Ukraine”. 
Their inquiries focused on fears of Ukrainians from 6 different regions, such as: 
 West (Volyn, Zakarpattya, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Ternopil, Chernivtsi regions); 
 Centre (Vinnytsya, Kyrovohrad, Poltava, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy regions); 
 North (Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv regions); 
 South (Cremea, Odesa, Kherson, Mykolaiv regions); 
 East (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kharkiv regions); 
 Donbas (Donetsk, Luhansk regions). 
The inquiries' primary results are summarized in Appendix A. 
Then, we suppose that the stressor that affects the society is elections and the changes in 
economic and social policy that follow them. Many social psychologists now agree that any election 
is a powerful stressor, due to “emotional pollution”. Steven Sosny supposes that the latter is caused 
by two main factors: a) superabundance of false advertising during the campaign and b) politicians' 
being abnormally certain about enormously complex problems. Being a specialist in couples living 
in emotional abuse, he also names election one of the two conditions (together with economic 
crises) that greatly increase demand for services of family psychologists: 
 
“I specialize in couples living in resentment, anger, or emotional abuse. Two 
conditions greatly increase demand for my services: economic crises and national 
elections. When they occur together, it's like a perfect storm of family contention. I 
have written previously (...) about how so many people download and recycle the 
negativity in their environment and ultimately take it out on the closest people to 
them” (Stosny, 2008). 
 
In their experimental study of 2011, Israeli researchers Israel Waismel-Manor, Gal Ifergane, 
and Hagit Cohen found that voters at the ballot box had higher positive and negative affect, as well 
exhibited cortisol levels that were significantly higher than their own normal levels obtained on a 
similar day. They think that election is a stressor due to the necessity of decision-making. Though in 
the experiment elevated cortisol levels calmed down just the next day, the researchers suppose it 
may have far-ranging social and societal outcomes, since such state is proved to affect memory 
consolidation, impair memory retrieval and lead to risk-seeking behavior (Waismel-Manor, Ifergan, 
Cohen, 2011). 
Within the period analyzed, the presidential election was held in Ukraine (January-February 
2010). We think that, in addition to common pre- and post-election psychological anxiety, an 
objective threat also occurred in this case. Namely, the out-party candidate became the winner. As a 
result, people had to adapt to a strong stressor – uncertainty concerning new economic and social 
policy. 
Thus, if the collective stress effect does hold true in the society, and if the correlation 
adaptometry method does work, then increase in both correlation between fears and their dispersion 
must be fixed after the election. Later, as the society adapts to the stressor, these two characteristics 
are supposed to decrease again. And finally, we expect the second wave of societal stress, caused by 
upcoming parliamentary election, which took place in October 2012. The empirical material 
presented in Appendix A seems to be appropriate to test the hypothesis. 
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Correlation Between Fears 
 
In (Gorban, Manchuk, and Petushkova, 1987), it is offered to depict the relations between the 
physiological parameters as a “correlation network” which vertices show the parameters considered, 
and edges connect pairs of the vertices with statistically strong interactions (edges closed to 
themselves, that indicate self-correlations, are not to be taken under consideration). Since each edge 
is attributed with the absolute value of a correlation coefficient, the network's total weight can be 
calculated, which represent the level of adaptation tension sought for. 
According to this, to assess the adaptation tension of Ukrainian society in each of the 
periods analyzed, the correlation network's total weight was calculated, as the following: 
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where ijr  is Pearson's correlation coefficient between prevalence rates of fears i  and j . 
The Pearson's correlation coefficient is defined as: 
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where ikx , jkx  are prevalence rates of fears i  and j , respectively, in region k ; 
r
ix , 
r
jx  are average 
values of prevalence rates of fears i  and j , respectively, with respect to regions; m  is number of 
regions, and  ijrz  is a correction factor, that excludes weak interactions out of the correlation 
network's total weight (only correlation coefficients which absolute values exceed a defined critical 
point are considered). 
The correction factor is put conditionally, as: 
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where 0r  is the critical point (in this research 0r  equals 0.7). 
 
Dispersion of Fears 
 
Since there is no universally accepted measure for dispersion, we use two alternative estimates here 
in the study. 
Formally, each region can be considered as a point in n -dimensional space, with the 
dimensions represented by the fears analyzed. 
As an appropriate inferior estimate, we propose the diameter of n -dimensional ball with the 
volume equal to that of n -dimensional parallelepiped in which the points are submerged – since at 
a fixed volume ball is the solid with minimal linear size. The volume V  is the product of 
amplitudes: 
 
   








n
i
ik
k
ik
k
xminxmaxV
1
, (4) 
6 
 
 
where ikx  is the prevalence rate of fear i  in region k ; n  is number of fears. 
In turn, the diameter mind  sought can be obtained as: 
 
n
n
min V
n
d 









1
2
2
, 
(5) 
 
where  x  is Euler's gamma function. 
As a superior estimate it is natural to use the maximal distance maxd  between the points: 
 
 kl
l,k
max dmaxd  . (6) 
 
Here, the distance kld  between points k  and l  is defined as the Euclidean metric: 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Correlation Between Fears 
 
In Appendix B, the absolute values of the Pearson's correlation coefficients between prevalence 
rates of fears are shown (the cells for which 7.0ijr  are coloured light grey, and those for which 
7.0ijr are coloured dark grey). 
In Figure 2, the dynamics of adaptation tension in Ukrainian society (calculated as the 
correlation network's total weight, or the sum of absolute values for colored cells from Appendix B) 
is shown. 
 
 
Figure 2. The dynamics of correlation between fears 
(measured as the correlation network's total weight) 
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As one can see from the figure, in March 2010 the correlation network's total weight 
significantly rose comparing with August 2009 (23.20 as against 15.72 points). Then, in March 
2011, it calmed down a bit (22.91 points), and in July 2012 demonstrated further growing (25.78 
points). Thus, the assumptions above mentioned seem to have proved out in general. 
The most questionable is the second interval, since the values of the correlation network's 
total weight in March 2011 and in March 2010 should hypothetically differ much more. We are 
inclined to seek the reason in the peculiarity of the initial data. Indeed, some fears are concerned to 
potential changes of political course after election, and they are naturally inherent to only a part of 
the society – namely, to respondents who approve of the alternative course. Thus, these fears can 
not characterize the adaptation tension of the whole society. 
Speculatively, such fears are ones of military aggression from Russia (17) and military 
aggression from West (19). Alternatively, it is possible to analyze the initial data more formally, 
and to exclude fears with relatively high “political dispersion”. In its 2012 survey, Rating 
Sociological Group examined not only geographical but also political distribution of fears (Rating, 
2012). All the respondents were questioned which party they support. The answers were coded as 
following: 
A. “Support the Political Party "Yuliya Timoshenko Block"”. 
B. “Support the Political Party "Svoboda"”. 
C. “Support the Communist Party”. 
D. “Support the Region Party”. 
E. “Support the Political Party "Ukraina, vpered!"” 
F. “Support the Political Party "Udar"”. 
G. “Do not support any political party”. 
For each fear, the coefficient of variation was calculated as a measure of dispersion, 
according to formula: 
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where ipx  is prevalence rate of i fear among the supporters of the political party p , and 
p
ix  is 
average value of prevalence rate of fear i  with respect to political party p . 
In Table 1, the political distribution of fears is shown, according to (Rating, 2012), and the 
political dispersion of each fear calculated. 
 
Table 1. Political distribution of fears in Ukrainian society, in 2012 
Code Fear of 
Prevalence rate of fear, %, 
by supporters of the political parties* CV 
In general A B C D E F G 
1 economic regress 41 41 40 41 36 40 38 44 0.16 
2 rise in unemployment 44 43 39 42 39 53 44 47 0.27 
3 depreciation of hryvnya 15 19 12 12 12 17 24 13 0.77 
4 arbitrary rule 25 32 30 23 10 25 29 26 0.72 
5 degeneracy of population 20 18 30 29 21 24 18 17 0.73 
6 health services'worsening 20 19 9 31 24 26 14 22 0.92 
7 environmental accidents 17 12 15 14 21 13 15 18 0.51 
8 rise in crime 16 17 7 16 17 15 13 17 0.61 
9 mass exodus 10 10 7 9 10 13 15 9 0.67 
10 demographic crisis 8 8 10 5 8 12 8 9 0.68 
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Code Fear of 
Prevalence rate of fear, %, 
by supporters of the political parties* CV 
In general A B C D E F G 
11 schism of the state 13 16 13 16 12 9 14 11 0.49 
12 loosing sovereignty 11 17 33 5 7 4 11 11 2.27 
13 civil war 5 5 12 6 6 6 5 5 1.44 
14 education services' worsening 8 8 1 7 9 18 6 7 1.56 
15 
loosing control over 
the gas-transport system 
5 6 3 1 5 6 6 5 0.96 
16 coup d'etat 7 9 15 7 6 7 6 5 1.23 
17 military aggression from Russia 3 5 9 0 1 1 4 2 2.56 
18 terrorism 3 2 1 1 3 6 3 2 1.45 
19 military aggression from West 1 1 3 2 3 4 1 1 4.24 
* Letters refer to codes of the answers given above. 
 
Thus, the most politically dispersed fears (in Table 3 they are colored grey) are the ones 
pointed out speculatively, i.e. fears of military aggression from Russia (17) and military aggression 
from West (19); these fears are believed to be the most appropriate candidates to exclude. In 
Figure 3, the dynamics of the correlation network's weight is shown built after excluding politically 
colored fears revealed. If we do exclude politically colored fears, the dynamics of the correlation 
network's weight does change, and responds to the hypothesis more accurately. 
 
 
Figure 3. The dynamics of correlation between fears after excluding politically colored fears 
(measured as the correlation network's total weight) 
 
Dispersion of Fears 
 
In Table 2, the distances between regions in the “space” of fears analyzed are shown; they are 
calculated according to formula (7). 
In Figure 4, the dynamics of two measures of dispersion are shown. It can be seen from the 
figure that it follows the dynamics of correlation between fears, in general. 
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Table 2. The “distances” between regions in the “space” of fears analyzed 
“Distance” 
between 
regions 
West Centre North East South Donbas 
West: 2009 0 21.70 17.49 22.78 28.97 21.98 
2010 0 26.63 34.80 46.16 33.03 39.69 
2011 0 23.28 20.07 26.27 28.79 38.24 
2012 0 38.52 25.71 30.50 40.72 40.27 
Centre: 2009  0 26.63 27.75 31.59 23.24 
2010  0 20.30 28.39 15.75 25.88 
2011  0 21.19 24.58 19.72 24.98 
2012  0 26.48 27.24 30.79 19.54 
North: 2009   0 22.07 27.00 22.65 
2010   0 32.03 24.58 25.50 
2011   0 16.40 18.06 28.76 
2012   0 13.96 33.39 24.06 
East: 2009    0 14.90 10.49 
2010    0 19.65 35.97 
2011    0 11.87 24.66 
2012    0 34.55 22.09 
South: 2009     0 15.87 
2010     0 21.68 
2011     0 17.97 
2012     0 28.18 
Donbas:2009      0 
2010      0 
2011      0 
2012      0 
 
Figure 4. The dynamics of dispersion of fears 
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Qualitative Analysis 
 
According to qualitative analysis undertaken, there are no pairs of fears which prevalence rates 
correlate statistically strongly during all the periods – neither positively nor negatively. 
It can be also seen (Table 3) that, even though to exclude politically motivated fears (which 
are direct “markers” of the situation analyzed in Ukrainian society) there are some common, neutral 
fears which also signalize that the society is under stress. To such fears, we think it is naturally to 
subsume the fears of economic regress, degeneracy of population, and mass exodus. These fears’ 
interactions with the others came to the fore, and the others began to correlate with these crucial 
ones. 
It is also worth to note that such untypical interactions tend to attenuate during the next year 
(or two years). This could be interpreted as the renewal of normal functioning, which is the very 
same successful adaptation, considered at the beginning. But the fact of successful adaptation may 
be contravened by almost no decrease (in 2011 in comparison with 2010) and even increase (in 
2012 in comparison with 2011) in general number of strong interactions between fears. We think 
that the increase in 2012 ought to be explained by the future stress which Ukrainian society has 
been looking for: at the end of October regular – parliamentary – elections will take place. 
 
Table 3. Number of strong interactions of each fear with the others, by years 
 
The dynamics of both correlation between fears and their dispersion say that the collective 
stress effect holds true. Meanwhile, it is difficult to conclude whether the society has coped with the 
stress: in Figures 3 and 4, there are no clear-cut decreases after the election, in 2011, which would 
signal that the adaptation process has completed successfully. Instead, the re-increase observed in 
2012, though slight, hints that the society is moving towards disadaptation state (in Figure 1, it is 
depicted right). Even if this scenario is realized, this should not be conceived apocalyptically – this 
will mean that fears are not be attributed to the regions in the way they do now. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Data on prevalence rates of fears reigning within the Ukrainian society push to the conclusion 
concerning the collective stress effect's holding true in social as well as in biological systems and, 
therefore, concerning the legacy of using correlation adaptometry method in assessing adaptation 
Code Fear of 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 economic regress 3 7 7 2 
2 rise in unemployment 1 2 1 2 
3 depreciation of hryvnya 3 1 2 7 
4 arbitrary rule 4 0 3 3 
5 degeneracy of population 2 4 1 2 
6 health services' worsening 1 1 3 4 
7 environmental accidents 0 4 3 2 
8 rise in crime 1 2 4 2 
9 mass exodus 4 6 1 1 
10 demographic crisis 2 2 1 2 
11 schism of the state 2 5 3 6 
12 loosing sovereignty 3 6 6 7 
13 civil war 1 5 3 2 
14 education services' worsening 1 0 2 5 
15 loosing control over the gas-transport system 2 1 6 4 
16 coup d'etat 2 4 4 5 
18 terrorism 1 1 0 0 
Sum 33 51 50 56 
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tension of societies. Testing the hypothesis was undertaken via “overlapping” the data on 
prevalence rates of fears and priory a strong stressor which is believed to be a political factor, e.g. 
switching governing teams – in January 2010 and in October 2012. And, really, proceeding from 
the calculations undertaken, the analyzed social system behaved as if it were a biological system 
reacting to the stress appeared: the dynamics of both correlations between the fears and dispersion 
of fears look like reflecting the system's behavior in the course of adaptation. 
This pilot survey argue for the collective stress effect's holding true in social as well as in 
biological systems. Further research should imply involving vaster input data, describing the results 
of similar pools in Ukraine and other countries, both in past and in future. This is believed to result 
in revealing social systems which do or do not cope with the stress; analyzing structures of systems 
of these two classes would contribute to understanding, in terms of Martin Scheffer et al., “the 
architecture of fragility” (Scheffer et al., 2012). Involving vaster input data would also help select 
the most appropriate indicators to diagnose the situation more accurately, and, therefore, to choose 
the most valid signals for upcoming critical transitions. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Geographical distribution of fears in Ukrainian society, by years, based on (Rating, 2012) 
Code Fear of Period 
Prevalence rate of fear, %, by regions 
West Centre North East South Donbas 
1 economic regress 
08.2009 54 65 51 62 60 64 
03.2010 44 56 58 62 58 60 
03.2011 43 56 49 50 57 67 
07.2012 36 45 45 44 37 40 
2 rise in unemployment 
08.2009 44 43 35 46 46 44 
03.2010 39 40 31 46 48 49 
03.2011 46 47 44 52 50 44 
07.2012 36 54 40 36 50 48 
3 
 
depreciation of hryvnya 
08.2009 33 20 32 29 24 27 
03.2010 29 20 19 29 25 20 
03.2011 18 16 26 26 25 28 
07.2012 21 15 19 13 12 10 
4 arbitrary rule 
08.2009 31 26 35 46 53 44 
03.2010 20 26 26 46 31 15 
03.2011 26 18 27 26 22 17 
07.2012 28 20 20 19 42 20 
5 degeneracy of population 
08.2009 15 21 24 23 21 21 
03.2010 10 16 23 23 14 19 
03.2011 15 19 20 18 17 17 
07.2012 18 18 22 20 18 28 
6 
health services' 
worsening 
08.2009 12 11 13 10 16 11 
03.2010 12 7 17 10 12 19 
03.2011 9 15 17 17 19 17 
07.2012 12 28 12 17 26 28 
7 environmental accidents 
08.2009 12 10 16 16 10 12 
03.2010 7 11 22 16 15 24 
03.2011 13 12 11 14 13 15 
07.2012 15 11 18 22 16 21 
8 rise in crime 
08.2009 12 13 13 12 12 17 
03.2010 14 15 15 12 13 14 
03.2011 11 10 9 14 14 21 
07.2012 10 13 17 12 28 18 
9 mass exodus 
08.2009 13 11 7 4 6 5 
03.2010 12 7 6 4 5 6 
03.2011 14 19 8 6 9 9 
07.2012 13 16 8 6 7 11 
10 demographic crisis 
08.2009 6 5 11 4 6 6 
03.2010 5 6 11 4 5 4 
03.2011 9 13 13 6 6 9 
07.2012 11 9 10 4 5 8 
11 schism of the state 
08.2009 6 14 9 8 14 9 
03.2010 19 17 14 8 11 11 
03.2011 8 14 7 5 8 14 
07.2012 18 13 13 13 12 8 
12 loosing sovereignty 
08.2009 7 11 8 2 3 3 
03.2010 26 9 10 2 5 4 
03.2011 21 9 10 4 2 2 
07.2012 28 5 11 9 6 4 
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Code Fear of Period 
Prevalence rate of fear, %, by regions 
West Centre North East South Donbas 
13 civil war 
08.2009 3 4 4 3 5 7 
03.2010 9 3 3 3 5 5 
03.2011 9 8 9 6 10 4 
07.2012 5 4 5 5 7 6 
14 
education services' 
worsening 
08.2009 4 5 7 5 9 5 
03.2010 5 2 5 5 5 3 
03.2011 4 8 5 10 7 8 
07.2012 4 8 8 11 8 9 
15 
loosing control 
over the gas-transport system 
08.2009 9 5 12 10 11 6 
03.2010 11 10 9 10 7 3 
03.2011 9 7 10 4 5 2 
07.2012 9 1 8 4 4 4 
16 coup d'etat 
08.2009 8 11 5 5 4 8 
03.2010 10 8 11 5 7 5 
03.2011 8 6 3 4 5 4 
07.2012 13 6 5 4 8 4 
17 
military aggression 
from Russia 
08.2009 5 5 5 2 1 0 
03.2010 10 1 3 2 1 0 
03.2011 6 2 3 3 0 1 
07.2012 8 1 1 1 2 0 
18 terrorism 
08.2009 1 0 0 0 1 0 
03.2010 0 0 1 0 1 0 
03.2011 1 3 1 0 4 2 
07.2012 2 3 3 2 3 2 
19 
military aggression 
from West 
08.2009 1 3 1 1 2 1 
03.2010 2 0 3 1 6 1 
03.2011 1 2 1 1 1 2 
07.2012 2 2 1 1 2 0 
 
Population – people aged 18+. 
Sample size – 2000. 
Confidence level – 0,95. 
Confidence intervals: 
 2,2% – for prevalence rates about 50%; 
 2,0% – for prevalence rates about 30%; 
 1,3% – for prevalence rates about 10%; 
 1,0% – for prevalence rates about 5%. 
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Appendix B1. Pearson's correlation coefficients between prevalence rates of fears (August 2009) 
Code 
of 
fear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 1.00                   
2 0.66 1.00                  
3 -0.79 -0.37 1.00                 
4 0.19 0.44 -0.02 1.00                
5 0.14 -0.37 -0.21 0.32 1.00               
6 -0.35 -0.07 -0.09 0.42 -0.02 1.00              
7 -0.46 -0.46 0.68 0.07 0.48 -0.37 1.00             
8 0.38 -0.08 -0.11 0.07 0.14 -0.30 -0.10 1.00            
9 -0.27 -0.11 0.03 -0.80 -0.74 -0.02 -0.43 -0.31 1.00           
10 -0.77 -0.93 0.45 -0.17 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.07 0.02 1.00          
11 0.49 0.13 -0.90 0.13 0.33 0.46 -0.62 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13 1.00         
12 -0.20 -0.53 -0.19 -0.91 -0.15 -0.10 -0.22 -0.16 0.76 0.32 0.22 1.00        
13 0.41 0.06 -0.32 0.39 0.18 0.17 -0.36 0.87 -0.42 0.07 0.28 -0.31 1.00       
14 -0.17 -0.13 -0.23 0.59 0.45 0.88 -0.13 -0.22 -0.41 0.38 0.60 -0.22 0.24 1.00      
15 -0.73 -0.32 0.58 0.42 0.25 0.54 0.54 -0.55 -0.29 0.51 -0.22 -0.31 -0.37 0.58 1.00     
16 0.42 0.06 -0.41 -0.76 -0.39 -0.53 -0.48 0.32 0.63 -0.30 0.12 0.65 0.07 -0.67 -0.90 1.00    
17 -0.53 -0.56 0.21 -0.86 -0.22 -0.12 0.13 -0.50 0.76 0.36 -0.13 0.86 -0.70 -0.29 0.06 0.37 1.00   
18 -0.32 0.38 0.16 0.22 -0.70 0.66 -0.47 -0.47 0.40 -0.11 0.00 -0.15 -0.17 0.28 0.32 -0.24 0.00 1.00  
19 0.51 0.17 -0.90 -0.29 0.04 0.17 -0.70 -0.18 0.34 -0.30 0.87 0.54 0.00 0.20 -0.47 0.50 0.21 0.00 1.00 
 
16 
 
Appendix B2. Pearson's correlation coefficients between prevalence rates of fears (March 2010) 
Code 
of 
fear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 1.00                   
2 0.36 1.00                  
3 -0.36 0.29 1.00                 
4 0.46 0.14 0.49 1.00                
5 0.81 -0.13 -0.34 0.44 1.00               
6 0.17 -0.03 -0.40 -0.52 0.30 1.00              
7 0.73 0.10 -0.59 -0.11 0.74 0.78 1.00             
8 -0.31 -0.67 -0.75 -0.70 -0.12 0.19 0.05 1.00            
9 -0.98 -0.36 0.25 -0.58 -0.75 -0.07 -0.64 0.41 1.00           
10 0.00 -0.88 -0.55 -0.11 0.36 0.27 0.28 0.64 -0.01 1.00          
11 -0.86 -0.59 -0.10 -0.57 -0.65 -0.23 -0.61 0.72 0.87 0.28 1.00         
12 -0.98 -0.50 0.31 -0.45 -0.68 -0.09 -0.65 0.38 0.97 0.14 0.86 1.00        
13 -0.85 0.08 0.50 -0.49 -0.81 0.11 -0.51 -0.02 0.83 -0.33 0.51 0.79 1.00       
14 -0.15 -0.16 0.60 0.40 0.04 0.17 -0.04 -0.49 0.02 0.18 -0.23 0.20 0.28 1.00      
15 -0.48 -0.57 0.46 0.44 -0.17 -0.70 -0.74 0.02 0.38 0.24 0.47 0.52 0.08 0.29 1.00     
16 -0.62 -0.91 -0.17 -0.31 -0.25 0.03 -0.29 0.66 0.58 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.25 0.26 0.53 1.00    
17 -0.91 -0.43 0.56 -0.19 -0.56 -0.10 -0.64 0.09 0.87 0.06 0.65 0.94 0.79 0.46 0.60 0.60 1.00   
18 0.20 -0.30 -0.28 0.08 0.15 0.29 0.32 0.11 -0.32 0.64 -0.16 -0.16 -0.22 0.49 -0.09 0.41 -0.18 1.00  
19 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.08 -0.23 0.19 0.06 -0.23 -0.16 0.18 -0.19 -0.04 0.17 0.62 -0.14 0.20 0.00 0.85 1.00 
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Appendix B3. Pearson's correlation coefficients between prevalence rates of fears (March 2011) 
Code 
of 
fear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 1.00                   
2 -0.18 1.00                  
3 0.42 0.02 1.00                 
4 -0.87 0.22 0.09 1.00                
5 0.11 -0.09 0.17 0.01 1.00               
6 0.60 0.27 0.69 -0.24 0.57 1.00              
7 0.51 0.22 0.40 -0.39 -0.57 0.08 1.00             
8 0.77 -0.03 0.60 -0.55 -0.36 0.33 0.91 1.00            
9 -0.07 -0.24 -0.92 -0.42 -0.08 -0.54 -0.32 -0.39 1.00           
10 -0.06 -0.71 -0.41 -0.14 0.57 -0.21 -0.68 -0.50 0.55 1.00          
11 0.70 -0.51 -0.27 -0.93 0.02 -0.02 0.19 0.36 0.61 0.44 1.00         
12 -0.77 -0.33 -0.67 0.46 -0.35 -0.93 -0.41 -0.60 0.49 0.37 -0.15 1.00        
13 -0.59 0.12 -0.43 0.45 0.02 -0.17 -0.75 -0.77 0.25 0.13 -0.38 0.43 1.00       
14 0.51 0.59 0.30 -0.40 0.26 0.57 0.52 0.46 -0.23 -0.38 0.12 -0.76 -0.61 1.00      
15 -0.77 -0.33 -0.51 0.59 0.20 -0.50 -0.88 -0.90 0.34 0.60 -0.30 0.78 0.74 -0.78 1.00     
16 -0.40 0.03 -0.82 -0.03 -0.70 -0.83 0.00 -0.26 0.70 -0.04 0.15 0.71 0.35 -0.41 0.29 1.00    
17 -0.83 -0.16 -0.46 0.62 -0.33 -0.88 -0.20 -0.48 0.21 0.18 -0.36 0.91 0.17 -0.53 0.61 0.54 1.00   
18 0.52 0.01 -0.19 -0.63 -0.03 0.34 -0.10 0.10 0.39 0.01 0.52 -0.34 0.34 0.00 -0.17 0.15 -0.69 1.00  
19 0.73 -0.40 -0.18 -0.92 0.15 0.07 0.27 0.42 0.51 0.41 0.96 -0.27 -0.57 0.35 -0.42 0.00 -0.37 0.35 1.00 
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Appendix B4. Pearson's correlation coefficients between prevalence rates of fears (July 2012) 
Code 
of 
fear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 1.00                   
2 0.08 1.00                  
3 -0.03 -0.53 1.00                 
4 -0.74 0.22 -0.08 1.00                
5 0.12 0.05 -0.46 -0.45 1.00               
6 -0.01 0.90 -0.80 0.16 0.22 1.00              
7 0.06 -0.50 -0.41 -0.26 0.64 -0.19 1.00             
8 -0.31 0.51 -0.51 0.72 0.08 0.46 0.05 1.00            
9 0.00 0.42 0.27 -0.24 -0.11 0.28 -0.73 -0.45 1.00           
10 -0.05 -0.07 0.73 -0.26 0.05 -0.35 -0.47 -0.43 0.67 1.00          
11 -0.24 -0.54 0.86 0.16 -0.75 -0.69 -0.44 -0.50 0.21 0.40 1.00         
12 -0.48 -0.69 0.82 0.10 -0.37 -0.76 -0.17 -0.51 0.18 0.54 0.87 1.00        
13 -0.63 0.15 -0.50 0.74 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.85 -0.57 -0.46 -0.40 -0.22 1.00       
14 0.60 0.14 -0.72 -0.34 0.36 0.35 0.58 0.19 -0.52 -0.76 -0.69 -0.79 0.08 1.00      
15 -0.36 -0.75 0.73 0.08 0.00 -0.86 0.18 -0.20 -0.21 0.51 0.55 0.80 0.07 -0.59 1.00     
16 -0.74 -0.24 0.63 0.53 -0.57 -0.36 -0.51 -0.15 0.34 0.45 0.80 0.84 0.04 -0.92 0.53 1.00    
17 -0.66 -0.48 0.71 0.33 -0.50 -0.54 -0.34 -0.36 0.28 0.47 0.86 0.95 -0.09 -0.87 0.64 0.96 1.00   
18 0.31 0.57 0.09 0.30 -0.37 0.21 -0.58 0.51 0.05 0.07 -0.06 -0.39 0.00 0.00 -0.25 -0.11 -0.31 1.00  
19 -0.26 0.13 0.46 0.55 -0.96 -0.09 -0.80 0.01 0.30 0.12 0.72 0.38 -0.16 -0.54 0.00 0.69 0.56 0.45 1.00 
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